洛阳市行政执法错案责任追究办法
河南省洛阳市人民政府
洛阳市行政执法错案责任追究办法
（1999年5月4日洛阳市人民政府第40号令发布）
第一章 总 则
第一条 为加强行政执法监督，促进行政执法机关依法行政，预防和减少错案，保护公民、法人和其他组织的合法权益，根据《中华人民共和国行政处罚法》和《河南省行政机关执法条例》，结合本市实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称行政执法机关是指具有行政执法权的行政机关和法律、法规授权的具有管理公共事务职能的组织以及行政执法机关在其法定权限内委托的符合法定执法条件的组织。
第三条 行政执法错案责任追究，是指行政执法机关及其行政执法人员在行政管理活动因违法或不当的具体行政行为，给公民、法人或其他组织的合法权益造成损害时，依法追究其行政责任的监督措施。
第四条 市、县（市）、区人民政府及其组成部门的法制机构受理公民、法人和其他组织对违法或不当的具体行政行为的投诉。
第五条 行政执法错案责任追究，应当坚持实事求是、有错必究、法律面前人人平等的原则。
第六条 公民、法人和其他组织对行政机关及其行政执法人员的违法或不当的具体行政行为有申诉和举报权，并受法律保护。对于打击、报复申诉人、举报人的，行政监察机关应当予以查处。
第二章 追究机构
第七条 市人民政府统一领导全市行政执法错案责任追究工作。市、县（市）、区人民政府及其组成部门的法制机构是行政执法错案责任追究机构，具体负责本办法的实施。
第八条 市人民政府对于本行政区域内的重大、复杂的行政执法错案，可直接予以追究。
县（市）、区人民政府和乡（镇）人民政府的错案，由其上一级人民政府错案责任追究机构负责追究；市、县（市）、区人民政府组成部门的错案，由同级人民政府错案责任追究机构负责追究；实行垂直管理的工作部门的错案，由其上一级主管部门错案责任追究机构负责追究；部门重大的、复杂的错案，可由同级人民政府及其上一级主管部门联合组织追究。
第九条 行政执法错案责任追究机构处理违法或不当的具体行政行为，应当调查取证，必要时可以调阅有关行政执法案卷材料。被调查的机关及其工作人员应当予以配合，不得阻挠。
第十条 错案责任单位可对本机关的错案自查自究，自查自究结束后15日内，将结果报上一级错案责任追究机构备案；自查自究适当的，上一级错案责任追究机构不再追究。
第十一条 各级行政监察、人事等部门应当依照各自的职责，协助错案责任追究机构做好错案责任追究工作。
第三章 错案的范围
第十二条 国家机关依照法定程序认定的以下具体行政行为为错案：
（一）经人民法院生效判决撤销或者部分撤销、变更的；
（二）经本级人民政府、上一级机关、行政复议机关决定撤销、变更的；
（三）经行政机关自行撤销、纠正的；
（四）已经造成行政赔偿的。
第十三条 行政机关和行政执法人员的职权行为，有下列情形之一的，应当追究错案责任：
（一）违法拘留或者违法采取行政强制措施，给公民的人身或财产造成损害。给法人或其他组织造成损失的；
（二）没有法定依据实施行政处罚，或者违反法定程序实施行政处罚的；
（三）擅自改变行政处罚种类、幅度，或者违法委托实施行政处罚的；
（四）实施罚款、没收财物不使用法定收据，违法自行收缴罚款，或者向行政机关返还罚款、拍卖款项的；
（五）将罚款、没收的财物截留、私分，利用职务上的便利索取、收受他人的财物，或者使用、损毁扣押的财物给当事人造成损失的；
（六）为牟取本单位利益，对应当移交司法机关追究刑事责任的不移交，以行政处罚代替刑罚的；
（七）玩忽职守，对应当制止、处罚的违法行为不制止、不处罚，致使公民、法人或者其他组织的合法权益、公共利益和社会秩序遭受损害的；
（八）法律、法规、规章规定的其他应当予以追究的行为。
第四章 错案责任的确认及追究
第十四条 错案责任依照下列规定划分：
（一）行政执法人员当场作出的具体行政行为构成错案的，追究该执法人员的责任；
（二）经审核、批准作出的具体行政行为，由于案件承办人的过错导致审核人、批准人失误发生错案的，追究承办人的责任；由于审核人的过错导致批准人失误发生错案的，追究审核人的责任；由于批准人的过错发生错案的，追究批准人的责任；承办人、审核人、批准人均有过错发生的错案，同时追究承办人、审核人、批准人的责任；
（三）经集体讨论作出具体行政行为发生错案的，作出决定的行政机关负责人负主要责任，主张错误意见的其他人员负次要责任，主张正确意见的人员不负责任；
（四）因非法干预导致错案发生的，追究干预者的责任。
第十五条 错案责任追究机构对确认为错案的责任人，应当根据造成错案的故意或过失、后果的轻重和认错态度等情节，分别给予从重、从轻或免予处理。
第十六条 错案责任人具有下列情形之一，尚未构成犯罪的，应当从重处理：
（一）隐瞒案件事实真相，隐匿、涂改、销毁证据或者指使他人作伪证有意造成错案的；
（二）徇私枉法、索贿、受贿严重失职，造成错案的；
（三）错案发生后，故意隐瞒事实、拒不承认或推诿的；
（四）情节恶劣，损害和影响重大的。
第十七条 错案责任人有下列情形之一的，可以从轻或免予处理：
（一）因过失造成错案，且情节轻微，损害和影响较小的；
（二）错案发生后，能主动认错并积极配合纠正错案，挽回损失的；
（三）错案发生后逾期2年未被发现的。
第十八条 对错案责任人的处理方式：
（一）批评教育，责令写出书面检查、通报批评、责令改正、扣发职务工资、责令停职学习、收回《河南省行政执法证》、取消行政执法资格、调离行政执法岗位、依法予以辞退；
（二）依法给予警告、记过、记大过、降级、撤职、开除的行政处分；
（三）构成犯罪的，依法移交司法机关追究刑事责任。
第十九条 本办法第十八条规定的处理方式，按下列规定执行：
（一）批评教育和责令写出书面检查，由被追究人员所在机关实施；
（二）通报批评、责令改正、责令停职学习、收回《河南省行政执法证》、取消行政执法资格，由市、县（市）、区人民政府或人民政府法制机构实施；
（三）扣发职务工资、调离执法岗位、依法予以辞退，由被追究人员所在机关依据管理权限实施；
（四）给予行政处分由上级行政机关、被追究人员所在机关或者行政监察机关依法实施。
第二十条 因行政执法错案，向公民、法人和其他组织赔偿损失的，赔偿义务机关赔偿损失后，应当向错案责任人追偿部分或者全部赔偿费用。
第五章 错案责任追究程序
第二十一条 错案责任追究机构追究错案责任，应当按照下列程序：
（一）发现错案线索，组织有关人员进行调查或复查；
（二）确定对案件进行立案调查并书面通知被调查单位和有关人员；
（三）全面收集证据，听取被调查人的陈述和辩解；
（四）决定提请确认错案；
（五）查明错案的原因、情节、后果和有关人员的责任；
（六）根据调查结果，分别对错案责任人提出处理意见，依照本办法第十九条规定移交有关部门决定或批准。
第二十二条 行政机关发现错案后，应当按照本办法第八条的规定于15日内向行政执法错案责任追究机构报告。
第二十三条 行政机关对错案责任人的处理决定，应当自立案之日起2个月内作出。在作出处理决定的同时，应当纠正造成错案的具体行政行为。
行政机关对错案责任人不及时处理的，错案责任追究机构应责令其限期作出处理，并可视情节轻重向有关机关建议追究其主要负责人的责任。
第二十四条 行政机关应将认定错案结论和处理决定及时书面通知错案责任人。
错案责任人对认定结论或处理决定不服的，可依照国家有关规定提请复核或申诉。复核和申诉期间，不停止原决定的执行。
第六章 附则
第二十五条 行政执法错案责任追究制度实施过程中的办案经费应当列入年度财政预算。
第二十六条 本办法由市人民政府法制局负责解释。
第二十七条 本办法自发布之日起施行。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
